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are guilty of falsehood and fraud, their
principal is liable for the consequences
which may flow therefrom. The true test
of the liability of the principal in such
cases is to ascertain whether, in committing fraud, the agent wasactingin the business of his principal. If he was engaged
in the course of his employment, then parties injured by his misconduct or fraud
can resort for redress to the persons who
clothed him with the power to act in
their behalf, and who have received the
benefits resulting from his agency."
So much for the liability of a corporation for the torts of its servants based on
the theory of respondeat superior. Such
liability as we have seen is imposed
agreeably to an absolute rule of law based
on grounds of public policy, and not upon
the theory that the acts and motives of
the servants are to be imputed to the
master. The acts of the servant, done
in the course of his employment, whether tortious or not, are not deemed
those of the master. This is true where
the master is a corporation just as much
as where the master is an individual.
It must not, however, be forgotten, that
a corporation can act although not through
its servants. The instrumentality through
which a corporation acts is ordinarily its
board of directors, or a meeting of its
shareholders. The board of directors is
not a servant of the corporation, but is
a body authorized to act for the corporation. Its authorized acts are those of
the corporation itself. But it can act
for the corporation only within the scope

of its authority, and when it acts without the scope of its authority, its acts
are no longer those of the corporation.
Hence it would seem that where the
board of directors directly orders or procures the commission of any tortions act,
the corporation cannot be visited with
liability therefor. For the tortious act
is not that of the company, since it was
without the authority of the board, and
the principle of respondeat superior cannot be invoked, since the board of directors is not the servant of the corporation. For this reason it would seem
to be true, as Lord BRAMeWELL states,
"that no action (of malicious prosecution) lies, even if you assume the strongest case, namely, that of the very shareholders directing it, or the very directors
ordering it," but not for the reason given
by him, "because it is impossible that
Acorporation can have malice or motive, "I
but because the act of the board of
directors was ultra vires, and therefore
not the act of the company. The same
principle would apply to any other sort
of tort, just as well as to malicious prosecution. Whether the tortious act ordered by a unanimous vote of the entire
body of shareholders would be the act
of the corporation, depends upon whether
we regard the charter of the corporation
as endowing it with its corporate powers, or defining the powers which it may
exercise with the sanction of the law.
See 2 Morawetz Corp., 648 et seq. See,
further, 8 Am. L. Reg. (0. S.) 701.
Louis M. GREELEY.
Chicago.
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Supreme Court of Vermont.
CLARK v. CLARK'S ADM'R.
An action of assumpsit'cannot be sustained for use and occupation of real estate,
unless the relation of landlord and tenant exists under a contract express or implied;
and a contract will not be implied when neither party expected payment of rent.

CLARK v. CLARK.
An executor, during the settlement of an estate allowed the father of the devisees
to oecupy lands bequeathed to them, neither party expecting payment, they living
with their father, but never having had possession nor the right of possession ; held,
that assumpsit would not lie against their father's estate for the use, and that nothing could be recovered, although the case was tried under a reference.
The relation of parent and child tends rather to rebut than to raise the implication
of a contract for rent.

Assu Psrr for use and occupation. Heard on a referee's report.
The referee found that the plaintiffs, unmarried young ladies, are
the children of L. P. Clark, who died July 12th 1882; that one
Wilkins, who deceased in July 1876, bequeathed the use of certain
lands to the plaintiffs, another sister and their mother, Frances
Clark; that these lands consisted of two farms, on one of which
the said Wilkins, at the time of his death, said L. P. Clark, his
wife and daughters, lived together as one family; that said Clark
and his family continued to live on the farm until his death; that
he had the control of both farms, and appropriated the income
thereof to himself; that the executor left Clark in the "undisturbed
possession" of both farms, and in his settlement of his accounts, in
1888, with the Probate Court, did not account for the rents and
profits of said farms; that the amount of debts proved against the
estate of Wilkins was $4540.24, including about $1700, for which
he was liable only as surety of said L. P. Clark.
The said $1700 having been adjusted in some way, so as to release
the estate of said Wilkins, on March 2d 1883, the Probate Court
decreed said real estate among the devisees named in the will. In
1877 the executor sold some of said lands, and from the avails of
these and the personal property received enough to pay the personal
debts of said Wilkins; and the plaintiffs claimed that, as their
father received the use of the lands for about five years after the
personal debts had been provided for, his estate was liable. It was
found that the farm was much improved under Clark's management; that the use of the farm, above improvements and taxes, was
$100 per year; that one of the plaintiffs was generally at home,
assisting her parents, and the other taught school, boarding at home
for the most part of the time; and that the girls fully earned what
they received from their father in the way of support.
-. B. Hard, for defendant.
-Lyman B. Knapp and F. -E.Woodbridge, for plaintiffs.
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The opinion of the court was delivered by
Ross, J.-These are actions of assumpsit to recover for the use
and occupation of real estate. The facts on which, in our judgment, the cases turn are alike. It is, therefore, needless to allude
to the questions presented by the facts in which they differ. It is
well settled that to lay the foundation for a recovery in assumpsit
for use and occupation of real estate, th6 relation of landlord and
tenant must exist under a contract express or implied : Stacy v.
Vermont Cent. Bd., 32 Vt. 551; Watson v. Brainard,33 Id. 83;
Chamberlin v. Donahue, 44 Id. 57 ; Moore v. Harvey, 50 Id. 297 ;
Tayl. Land. & Ten., sects. 25, 636 and n. ; Hough v. Birge, 11
Vt. 190; Strong v. Garfield, 10 Id. 502; Birch v. Wright, 1 T.
R. 378.
While in Watson v. Brainard it is said that in certain cases a
contract will be implied from slight circumstances, the general holding in all the decisions is, that when the facts and circumstances
are such as to rebut the expectation on the part of both parties of
the payment of rent, the court will not imply a contract or promise
to pay such rent. Thus, a contract to purchase and occupation
under it (Hfough v. Birge, supra); a contract or other fact inconsistent with the relation of landlord and tenant (Stacy v. VTermont
Cent. Bd., supra); a suit and judgment in ejectment (Strong v.
Garfield, supra); occupation in the right of the wife and refusal to
acknowledge the owner as landlord (Chamberlin v. -Donahue,
supra); occupation when the plaintiff denies the existence of any
contract for the use of the premises (Moore v. Harvey, supra)-have
each been held not to raise but to rebut the implication of a tenancy
or the right to recover rent.
The referee has found that no express contract existed between
the respective plaintiffs and the intestate in reference to his use and
occupation of the premises; ' and he is unable to find that either
party expected any payment of rent for the occupation by the
intestate.
We think this finding, especially in connection with the other
facts found in reference to the intestate's ocbupation of the respective premises, does not raise, but rebuts, the implication of the
relation of landlord and tenant, and a contract to pay rent. By the
terms of the bequests by which the plaintiffs acquired the right to
the use of the premises, the profits arising from the use of the real
estate, annually, were to be used by the testator's executor to pay
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the balance of his indebtedness that should not be paid from
the avails of his personal estate. Until the testator's debts were
paid the executor was entitled to the rents. Such debts were
not all paid until after the time for which the recovery of rent is
claimed.
The debts which the testator incurred as surety for the intestate
Clark were proved against the testator's estate, and were debts between the testator and the creditors, which belonged to the testator
to pay. The payment of the debt was as much charged by the testator upon the use of the real estate bequeathed as was the payment
of the testator's individual debts. There is no fact found that tends
to show that the executor surrendered the possession of the lands
devised to the devisees, these plaintiffs, at any time before he settled his administration account. Under these facts section 2137,
R. L. would seem to be conclusive that the plaintiffs, until the
decree of the Probate Court, had no right to the possession of the
premises for which they now respectively seek to recover rent. That
section reads: "When an executor or administrator is appointed
and assumes the trust, no action of ejectment or other action to
recover the seisin or possession of land, or for damage done to such
land shall be maintained by an heir or devisee until there is a
decree of the probate court assigning such lands to such heir or
devisee, or the time allowed for paying debts has expired, unless
the executor or administrator surrenders the possession to the heir
or devisee."
During the time for which the plaintiffs seek to recover rent
there was an executor in the active administration of the estate of
the testator, charged by the will with the duty to use the rents and
profits accruing from the land for the payment of his debts above
what might be paid by his personal property; there were debts
above what were paid from the personal property remaining unpaid,
and nothing to show that the time allowed by the probate court for
their payment had expired; and there had been no surrender of the
possession of the devised lands by the executor to the devisees.
The plaintiffs could not, therefore, during the time for which they
claimed to recover rent have recovered the possession of the devised
lands. The plaintiffs during that time were never in possession of
the devised lands.
It follows logically that, not being at any time in possession, nor
by the terms of the will entitled to possession, nor having the right

CLARK v. CLARK.

to recover possession, they cannot during said interval recover rent
for the use of said devised lands.
The relation which existed between the plaintiffs and the intestate Clark, that of father and children, all residing harmoniously
together on the premises as a family without any accounts being
kept or charges made either for support, board or services, and
without anything being said between them in regard to the use of
said premises; and the manner in which the intestate used and
carried on said devised lands, improving the land, building and repairing the buildings, also tend to rebut any implication of the
relation of landlord and tenant, or of the payment of rent. Whether a child could recover for the use of its real estate occupied by
a parent without an express contract, or circumstances which in
law amount to a contract, we have no occasion to consider or decide.
We only say that the existence of that relation tends rather to
rebut than to raise the implication of a contract for rent. While
between the plaintiffs and the intestate, in the way that the executor of Wilkins' estate settled his account with the Probate Court,
without requiring the intestate to account for the use of the devised
premises for nearly five years, it appears equitable that the plaintiffs should be compensated in some way from their father's estate
for such use as has been beneficial to his estate, we are clear that
on well-settled principles they, on the facts found, cannot recover
for the use of the devised lands before they were legally entitled to
the possession of such lands. What might have been their rights
against the executor on the settlement of his administration account
we have no occasion to consider.
The result is that the pro forma judgment of the county court
for the plaintiff, in each case, is reversed, and judgment rendered
for the defendant to recover his costs. Judgment to be certified to
the Probate Court.
The rule announced in the principal
case is that which generally prevails both
in this country and in England, however unjust and inequitable it may appear. It is an old doctrine and is constantly invoked by the courts, yet a few
cases seem to have in a manner repudiated it. The notion that the relation of
landlord and.tenant must exist between
the parties, before the action of use and
occupation can be maintained, is* the

essence of the doctrine. "Though the
law will imply a contract to pay rent
from the mere fact of occupation, yet
this action lies only where 'the relation
of landlord and tenant subsists between
the parties, founded upon agreement,
express or implied. But no implication
can arise, if there was no tenancy in
contemplation between them :" Taylor
on Landlord and Tenant, sec. 636; or,
as stated in the principal case, when the
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facts and circumstances are such as to
rebut the expectation on the part of both
parties of the payment of rent ; or if the
position of the parties to each other can
be referred to any other ground than that
of a distinct tenancy, no promise to pay
rent can be implied as in case of a mere
trespasser: Abbott's Trial Evidence,
351 ; Carpenter v. United States, 17
Wall. 489 ; Boston v. Binney, 11 Pick.
I ; Holmes v. Williams, 16 Minn. 164;
Mayo v. Fletcher, 14 Pick. 525 ; Ackerman v. Lyman, 20 Wis. 454; Bancroft
v. Wardwell, 13 Johns. (N. Y.) 490;
Henwood v. Cheeseman, 3 S. & R. (Pa.)
500.
" To create the relation of landlord
and tenant, an agreement, either express
or implied, must exist. Presumptive
evidence will not do, such as that the
defendant holds over after the expiration of his lease by parol. But the
facts must show, expressly or impliedly,
that the defendant occupies as tenant of
the plaintiff. * * * When a person occupies the land of another, not as tenant,
but adversely, or where the circumstances
under which he enters show that he does
not recognise the owner as his landlord,
this action will not lie :" Butler v. Cowles,
4 Ohio 213.
In Burley v. Lamoreaux, 29 Minn.
138, the suit was for use and occupation
of certain premises in the nature of assumpsit. The complaint contained no
allegations of any facts showing that the
relation of landlord and tenant subsisted
between the plaintiff and defendant at
the time of the alleged use and occupation. The court held that it failed to
state a cause of action, and upon demurrer the suit was dismissed. The court
said : " The plaintiff appears to claim
that he has framed his complaint upon
the theory of waiving a tortious entry
and occupation of the premises by defendant, and suing upon an implied contract to pay for use and occupation. One
obstacle in the way of this claim is that
no tortious entry or occupation is in any

way alleged. But the insuperable answer to it is found in the authorities
above cited, which hold, in effect, that
a trespasser cannot be converted into a
tenant without his consent. In other
words, to maintain an action for use and
occupation, there must have been an
agreement, express or implied, by which
the relation of landlord and tenant is
created between the parties. Privity of
contract between them is indispensable."
In Edmonson v. Kite, 43 Mo. 176, 178,
suit was brought for the rent, use and
occupation of a house, the property of
plaintiff. The evidence showed that
the defendant did not rent the rooms of
plaintiff. Defendant admitted occupancy,
but stated that he occupied during the
term in pursuance of orders from the
military commander of the port. Plaintiff recovered in the trial court, but this
judgment was reversed, the Supreme
Court holding that the relation of landlord and tenant did not exist between
the parties, and therefore no recovery
could be had, that a trespasser could not
be sued for use and occupation. Other
Missouri cases have declared the same doctrine : Button v. Powers, 38 Mo. 353,
356, where one tenant in common sought
to recover from his co-tenant for use and
occupation, which was denied : Cohen v.
Kyler, 27 Mo. 122; flood v. Mathis,
21 Id. 308, 313 ; O'Fallon v. Boismenu,
3 Id. 405, 408-409 ; The dull Savings
Bank; . Aull, 80 Id. 199, 201, where
defendant's agent occupied office room in
a bank building for about four years;
nothing was said about paying rent and
no charges were made therefor on the
bank's books ; the action was dismissed:
Doyle v. O'Neil, 7 Mo. App. 138, 141.
In Central Mills Co. v. Hart, 124
Mass. 123, 125, the evidence was, that
trustees managing a railroad used, in
common with the plaintiff and others,
land owned by the plaintiff outside the
location of the railroad. It was held,
in the absence of any evidence of a demise, that the action could not be sup-
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ported against the trustees, whether the
use was by permission of the plaintiff or
not. The court declared that to maintain the action, something in the nature
of a demise must be shown, or some
evidence given to establish the relation
of landlord and tenant, and which relation could only grow out of contract ;
that the contract need not be technical
and formal, but there must be at least a
permissive occupation by the tenant,
"Occupation by the tenant, with the assent of the landlord, is indispensable to
the maintenance of the action." The
court was of the opinion that, if the defendant occupied the premises by mere
license of plaintiff-it being revocable at
plaintiff's pleasure-solongas itremained
executory, and until so countermanded,
could only operate as an excuse for trespass, and that if the occupancy was not
with plaintiff's permission, then it was a
merq trespass and not a demise. "The
relation of landlord and tenant in that
case would have no existence between
the parties." See Wood v. Wilcox, 1
Denio 37; Merrill v. Bullock, 105
Mass. 486, 490; Goddard v. Hall, 55
Maine 579 ; Espy v. Fenton, 5 Oregon
423, where it is said that if the relation
of landlord and tenant does not exist,
the possession is hostile, and the owner's
remedy is by ejectment and for damages.
In Marquette, 6-c., Rd. v. Barlow, 37
Mich. 554, the action was against the railroad company for rent for the use and occupation of lands employed for the track.
As there was no evidence of any agreement to pay for the use, the only question of liability arose out of what was
claimed to be an implied obligation.
The evidence was to the effect that the
railroad company entered upon the land
without the owner's knowledge or consent, but that afterwards he gave consent
to building and grading the road, yet he
told the company that it was to gain no
rights of the soil; in fact, no rights
whatever. The owner never offered to
make a deed for the land, and the corn-

pany never asked for one. The owner
testified that be had repeatedly told the
company that it was a trespasser, but
had never given it notice to quit. Here
it was held that the relation of landlord
and tenant could not be inferred from
the facts, and as such relation is the
basis of the action, resting upon an express or implied agreement to pay rent
during the tenantey, which is wanting in
this case, the action must fail. See
Dalton v. Laudahn, 30 Mich. 349 ; Bogsett v. Ellis, 17 Mich. 351.
Moore v. Harvey, 50 Vt. 2971 300,
was an action in assumpsit for use and
occupation of a certain pasture. Plaintiff testified that he never hired the pasture to defendant ; that defendant never
agreed to pay for the use of it; that
there was no contract whatever, and
never had been, in respect to it ; that he
did not give defendant permission to
occupy it. The plaintiff was denied a
recovery: Gallagher v. Himelberger, 57
Ind. 63, is an instructive case, and fully
sustains the rule of the above authority.
See Wood's Landlord and Tenant, 610; Stringfellow v. Carry, 76 Ala. 394;
Newberg v. Cowan, 62 Miss. 570.
In Chamberlin v. Donohue, 44 Vt. 57,
the plaintiff and her daughter occupied a
homestead left by the plaintiff's husband
at his decease, without ever having had
the same set out to them by the Probate
Court. In the absence of the plaintiff,
the daughter married the defendant, and
he moved on to the place, and continued
to occupy and enjoy it, refusing, on demand, to buy it, or leave it, or pay rent,
but offering to let the plaintiff occupy
with him, which she declined to do, and
the defendant made no contract for the
use. The plaintiff finally brought ejectment, which failed for want of notice to
quit. In an action in assumpsit for the
;use and occupation, it was held, that the
trial court should have submitted the case
to the jury, to find whether or not an
implied contract of tenancy existed. In
giving the opinion, Ross, J., said:
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"To lay the foundation for recovery in
assumpsit for use and occupation, the
relation of landlord and tenant must
have existed between the parties, evidenced by a contract, either express or
implied: Stacy v. Vermont Central Rd.,
32 Vt. 551 ; Watson v. Brainardet al.,
33 Id. 88; Taylor on Landlord and
Tenant, sect. 636. Occupation alone
will raise this relation by implication,
only when the occupancy of the premises
has been with the assent of the owner,
and without any act or claim on the part
of the occupant, inconsistent with an
acknowledgment by the occupant of the
owner as his rightful landlord: Taylor
on Landlord and Tenant, sects. 636, 637.
This implication may be rebutted by
proof of a contract, or any other fact
inconsistent with the existence of such'a
relation: Stacy v. Vermont Rd., 32 Vt.
551 ; Taylor on Landlord and Tenant,
sects. 636, 637. A contract to purchase
and occupation under it, was held sufficient to rebut this implication of the
existence of this relation arising from
the occupancy, in Hough v. Birge, 11 Vt.
190. A suit and judgment in ejectment
has been held to be conclusive evidence
that this relation did not exist during the
time mesne profits could be recovered in
ejeetment suit: Strong v. Garfield, 10
Vt. 502.
In Chambers v. Ross, 25 N. J. L.
293, 294, it is said that, "the law will
imply a contract to pay rent from the
mere fact of occupancy, unless the character of the occupancy be such as to
negative the existence of a tenancy. The
action for use and occupation does not
necessarily suppose a demise." See
Dean and Chapterof Rochester v. Pierce,
I Camp. 467 ; Hull v. Vaughan, 6 Price
157 ; 2 Saund. Pl. & Ev. 890 ; Chitty
on Contracts 332.
In Ric/iey v. flinde, 6 Ohio 371, it is
held that this action lies only where a
tenancy is established. The court observed : "In Massachusetts a suit like
the present might be supported : 10 Mass.

433 ; 17 Id. 299. But in England and
New York, and in this state, it is settled
by authorities too strong to be disregarded,
that an action for use and occupation
will lie in these cases only where a. tenancy subsists: 2 Taunt. 145; 11 Id.
105; 6 Johns. R. 46; 13 Id. 489; 4
Ohio 205. The defendant entered on
the land as his own, claiming title ; consequently the suit is not sustainable in
this aspect."
Peters v. Elkins, 14 Ohio 344, holds
that assumpsit for use and occupation will not lie at the suit of a purchaser
of mortgaged premises, sold under a decree in chancery, against a tenant in
possession under the mortgage.
This action lies where a person enters
under an agreement for a term, although
he subsequently refuses to accept the
lease: Little v. Martin, 3 Wend. (N.
Y.) 219 ; or where a tenant holds over
after his term has expired, the presumption being that he holds as tenant
under the same terms as he held under
the lease; Rsell v. Fabyan, 34 N. H.
218; Evertsen v. Sawyer, 2 Wend. (N.
Y.) 507 ; Abed v. Radcli/J 13 Johns.

(N. Y.) 297.
In Mercer v. Mercer, 12 Ga. 421, it
is said that a contract to pay rent may
be implied from the title of the plaintiff
and the occupation of the defendant.
National Oil Refining Co. v. Bush, 88
Penn. St. 335, 340-341, does not seem
to harmonize with the general current of
authority, but is more in accord with the
Georgia case just cited. Here the defendant claimed to hold under a written agreement, the plaintiff denied the agreement
and notified the defendant that he would
eject him if lie did not quit the premises,
as he considered him a trespasser. Subsequently the defendant abandoned his
occupancy. The question whether or
not the defendant was a trespasser was
held to have been properly submitted to
the jury. The lower court, in instructing the jury, told them that they must
find some new contract between the par-
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ties, that the presumption that the tenant
was a trespasser, arising from the noices, might be rebutted. The Supreme
Court, in holding this error, observed :
" Such contract was not necessary to the
maintenance of the action ; it is not necessarily founded upon a specific contract, written or oral, but upon the use
of the premises. The occupant may be,
in fact, a trespasser, but the owner of
the tenement may waive the trespass

and recover in assumpsit, and it does
not lie with the tort.feasor to defeat him
by interposing his own wrong. To tell
the jury, therefore, that they must find
some new contract between the parties,
in order to rebut the presumption arising from the notices, was error, for the
presumption might well be rebutted by
the subsequent acts of the parties.
B. E. BLAcB.

St. Louis.

Court of Chancery of New Jersey.
IN RE PERRINE, &c.
A deaf mute who does not understand any matter of business, and cannot be made
to understand it, except it may be such as is of the most simple character, and who
has no comprehension of business matters, obviously cannot manage his own affairs,
and consequently is incapable of selecting an agent to transact them.
ON motion to set aside inquisition.

A. S. Appelget, for the.motion.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
RUNYON, Ch.-The inquisition in this case is signed by nineteen
of the twenty-four jurors. They find that the alleged lunatic " is
of sound mind, and is capable of controlling her property by her
own selection of a proper person to act for her." The other five
certify that she is "not of sufficient understanding to enable her to
manage her property." She is about sixty-five years old, and has
never been married. The commissioners have made a report concerning her condition. They say that she is not an idiot or lunatic,
in the popular sense of the words ; that she has been a deaf mute
ever since she was two or three years old; that she is ignorant,
having never been taught any language, whether spoken or of signs ;
that she can neither read nor write, and cannot express to others her
understanding, if any she have, of any business transaction ; that
she cannot be made to comprehend a business transaction, except,
perhaps, a very ordinary one, involving no more money than a dollar or two ; that she has learned to fetch and carry, and to do common, everyday housework,-that isshe can sweep, wash, cook an
ordinary meal, &c. ; that it is possible, by rude gestures, to com-
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municate to her a desire that she should do such work; that she
has never managed her property, nor any part thereof, and that the
acting trustee of her estate has never informed her of the amount,
character or income of her property, and that it is doubtful whether
she can be so informed ; that she has always been cared for by her
near relatives, with whom she has lived-by her mother for about
fifty years, and until her mother's death-after her mother's death;
by her unmarried sister, so long as that sister lived, and since thatsister's death, by her married sister, with whom she now lives. Application is made to set aside the inquisition on the ground that the
finding is contrary to the evidence.
Lord HALE says, that a man deaf and dumb from his birth, is, in
presumption of law, an idiot; and the rather, because he has no
possibility to understand what is forbidden by law to be done, or
under what penalties. He also says, that if it can appear that the
man has the use of understanding, which, he adds, many of that
condition discover by signs, to a very great measure, then he may
be tried, and suffer judgment and execution, though great caution
is to be used therein: Hale P. 0. 84.
In Brower v. Fisher, 4 Johns. Ch. 441, Chancellor KENT said,
speaking of such persons: "Perhaps, after all, the presumption, in
the first instance, is that every such person is incompetent. It is a
reasonable presumption, in order to insure protection and prevent
fraud, and is founded on the notorious fact, that the want of hearing
and speech exceedingly cramps the powers, and limits the range of the
mind. The failure of the organs requisite for general intercourse
and communion with mankind, oppresses the understanding,-affigat
humo divineparticulam aurce. A special examination to repel the
inference of mental imbecility, seems always to have been required."
A person born deaf and dumb, but not blind, is not an idiot;
Collin. Lun. 4, sect. 5; Shelf. Lun. 4; Brower v. Fisher, supra.
But, in order to warrant this court in interfering in behalf of a person to protect him against the consequences of his own mental incompetency, it is not necessary that he should be an idiot or a lunatic. It is enough, if, from any cause, whether by age, disease,
affliction or intemperance, he has become incapable of managing his
own affairs : 2 Mad. 732 ; 1 3B1. Com. 304; Bidgeway v. .Oarwin,
8 Yes. 65 ; Conorer's Case, 28 N. J. Eq. 330 ; Lawrence's Case,
Id. 331.
In Gibson v. Jeyes, 6 Yes. 267, 273, Lord ELDON says that,
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upon a commission in the nature of a writ de lunatico inquirendo,
it is not necessary to establish lunacy, but it is sufficient that the
party is incapable of managing.his own affairs.
It was so -held by Chancellor KENT, in Re Barker, 2 Johns. Ch.
232, where the person who was the subject of the inquiry had become
incapacitated by old age. Whether persons born deaf and dumb
are to be treated judicially as persons mentally incompetent to manage their affairs, must depend upon the evidence they are able to
give of the possession of capacity.
In Dickenson v. Blisset, 1 Dick. 268, a person who was born
deaf and dumb, and who had attained to her majority, applied for
possession of her real estate, and for an assignment to her of her
personal property. Lord Chancellor HARDWICKE, having put questions to her in writing, to which she gave sensible answers in writing, thereupon granted the application,
In Brower v. Fisher,4 Johns. Ch. 441, above cited, a commission
was issued to inquire as to the mental competency of such a person.
In the case in hand, the jury found that Miss Perrine was of
sound mind, and capable of controlling her property by her own
selection of a proper person to act for her. But if the proof was,
as the commissioners certify, that she is incapable of understanding
the business, or even of receiving any communication upon the subject, and therefore does not understand, and cannot be made to
understand, what the necessities of the management of her estate
demand, or what an agent is, or what his duties are, or, in other
words, if the proof was, as they certify, that she does not understand, and cannot be made to understand, any matter of business,
except it may be such as are of the most simple character; if she
has no comprehension of business matters,-it is obvious that she
is not capable of managing her affairs, and the inquisition cannot be
sustained. The jury does not find that she is herself competent to
manage her business, but that she is capable of controlling it by an
agent of her own selection. But if she cannot be made to understand what the business is, how can she select an agent to manage
The inquisition will be set aside.
it ?
The cases involving the capacity of
deaf mutes are not numerous, and hence
the principal case is worthy of careful
examination.
In Christmas v. Mitchell, 3 Ired. Eq.
541, Mr. Justice NAsH, in considering

this question, used the following language: "Formerly, one who was born
deaf and dumb was considered, in presumption of law, an idiot: I Hale P. C.
34. This presumption of law, ifit still exists, like every other presumption, yields
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to proof to the contrary, and Lord HARDwiciE decreed an estate to one born deaf
and dumb, upon his answering properly
questions put to him in writing: Dickenson. Blisset, 1 Dick. 268. But science
and benevolence have together rectified
the public mind as to such persons; and
it is no longer in common understanding
any evidence that an individual is an
idiot, because deprived from his birth of
the power of speech and hearing. No
one who has witnessed the wonders
worked in modern times, in giving instruction to unfortunates of this class,
would, after hearing the testimony in this
case, doubt that Leonidas Christmas
might have been instructed, not only in
the mechanic arts, but that his mind
might have been enlightened to receive
the high moral obligations of civil life,
and the still more profound truths of our
holy religion. We are constrained then
to say, that he does not come within the
exception contained in the statutes' '-of
limitation as being non compos mantis.
See, also, Potts v. Housc, 6 Ga. 356
Reynolds v. Reynolds, I Spears 256
Bainett v. Barnett, I Jones Eq. 222.
The subject is also somewhat considered, with reference to the will of an
aged testator whose hearing was somewhat affected, and whose sight was very
seriously impaired, in Weir v. Fitzgerald,
2 Bradf. 67, by BlADFORD, surrogate, as

follows: "B1y the Roman law no person
could make a valid will, who lacked one
of the principal senses; such, for example, as were deaf and dmnb, or blind.
Blackstone lays this down of those born
deaf, dumb and blind, who, he says, ' as
they have always wanted the common
inlets of understanding, are incapable of
having animum testandi, and their testaments are therefore void:' 2 Com. 497.
The rule was of necessity qualified by
the reason of it, which was a presumed
want of capacity. Persons horn deaf
and dumb could not make wills on the
supposition of insufficient capacity :
' Surdus, tnutus, testanientum facere non

passunt' (Dig. L. xxviii., tit. 1,

6, 7);

but subsequently it was allowed, where
the defects were not congenital, and there
existed sufficient testamentary capacity:
10. A blind man
Cod. lib. vi., tit. 22,
might make a nuncupative will by declaring the same before seven witnesses;
but he could not make a testament in
writing unless it was read to him and
acknowledged by him to be his will before witnesses: Cod. lib. vi., tit.
22, 8 ;
3, 4 ; Dig*. lib.
Inst. lib. 2, tit. 12,
xxxvii.,tit. 3. This was firstpermitted by
a decree of Justin, and continued to be
the rule of the civil law: ' chccus, autem,
non potest facere testamentum, nisi per observationem, quam lex divi Justini,patris
nostri, introduxit.'
" It has not, however, prevailed in
England, nor been incorporated in any
of the statutes relative to wills. The
object of requiring the will to be read to
the blind man was doubtless to prevent
fraud, the substitution of one instrument
for another, and to secure evidence beyond the mere factum of the will, of the
knowledge of the contents of the identical will by the testator. It has not been
made a formal ceremonial by our statute
in any case that the will should be read
to the testator in the presence of the witnesses, though it is eminently proper so
to do where the testator is blind or cannot read. The statute is satisfied by
the subscription of tie testator at the end
of the will in the presence of two witnesses, or the acknowledgment of such
subscription; the testamentary declaration
of the testator ; and the signature bythe
witnesses of their names at tie end of the
will at the request of the testator. 'These
forms are necessary ; but, even when
satisfied by the evidence, do not always
entitle the will to be admitted to proof.
Something more is necessary to establish
the validity of the will in cases where
from the infirmities of the testator, his
impaired capacity, or the circumstances
attending the transaction, the usual inference cannot be drawn from tie mere
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formal execution.

Additional evidence

make it clear that a person is not now

is therefore required that the testator's
to be considered an idiot from the- mere
mind accompanied the will, that he knew circumstances of his being deaf and
what he was executing, and was cognisaut dumb.
If, however, there is still a presumpof the provisions of the will. I think
that is all that ought to be required in tion of some degree of incapacity, civil
she proof of the will of a blind person. or criminal, in one who is deaf and
But it is not essential it should be estab- dumb, it is quite certain that it may be
lished by the subscribing witnesses. It rebutted by evidence. See, besides the
may be supplied aliunde. As subscribing cases already cited, Commonwealth v.
witnesses all that it is necessary they Bill, 14 Mass. 207; Morrison v. Lenshould prove is that concerning which nard 3 C. & P. 127; Rushton's Case, 1
they witnessed and which the statute re- Leach's Cr. L. 455; Rex v. Pritchard,
quires. This satisfies the statute ; and 7 C. & P. 303 ; Rex v. Dyson, Id. 305 ;
the additional evidence to which I have State v. Harris,8 Jones Law 140 ; Brown
referred as proper in certain cases may v. Brown, 3 Conn. 303.
be afforded by other persons."
Such presumption of quasi incapacity,
"The point presented is not entirely however, if it still exists, is at most a
new. In Moore v. Paine, 2 Cas. temp. weak presumption; and, perhapsi it
Lee 595, the deceased was blind, and may now be said that there is, at least
only one of the three subscribing wit- in the United States, no presumption of
nesses proved the instructions, the read- a defective understanding in persons
ing of the will to the testatrix, and her deaf and dumb. See Christmasv. Mitchapprobation of it. The will was sus- ell, and Potts v. House, supra.
tained on the ground that only one witBut, in order to insure protection and
ness was necessary. In Longchamp v. prevent fraud, proof would probably be
Fish, 5 B. & P. 415, before the Com- required that such person was capable
mon Pleas, the precise question camd of comprehending what he was doinig in
up. That was a will of lands, which, executing the instrument. See Weir v.
by the statute, was required to be exe- Fitzgerald,supra. To this extent, percuted in the presence of and subscribed haps, there may be a quasi presumption
by three witnesses. The will was not of incapacity ; or, rather the lack of the
read over in the presence of the three usual presumption of capacity resulting
attesting witnesses. The testator was from the formal execution of the instrublind; had dictated the will to one ment; but this is believed to be the
Davis, who read it over to him, took it limit of the doctrine. See 1 Redf. on
away, got it copied, brought it back Wills, 3d ed. 53, et seq. and notes ; 1
fairly copied; two months after the tes- Gr. Ev. sect. 366.
Coming now to the
tator made an alteration in it; and then
more particular
it was executed. It was contended that consideration of the principal case and
the will ought to have been read in thie applying the principles already stated,
presence of the testator by one, at least, there can be no doubt of its correctness.
of the three attesting witnesses. The The disability in this case seems to have
court, however, ruled in favor of the been much greater than in any of the
will." See also 1Finchamv. Edwards, cases above cited, and to have held that
3 Curtis 63.
the deaf mute could, in this case, select
The leading case of Brower v. Fisher, an agent to manage business, the nature
4 Johns. Ch. 441, decided by Chaxicellor
of which she could not be made to unKENT in 1820, and cited in the princiderstand, would be to stultify the law.
pal case, and the cases already cited,
X. D. EWELT..
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Supreme Court of New Hampshire.
KENT v. RAND.'
The promise of a married woman, made when the common-law disability of coverture existed, does not furnish a consideration upon which her promise to pay the
same debt, made after the disability is removed, can be sustained.

ASSUmPSIT, for money had and received by the defendant's intestate, Mary Snow, to the plaintiff's use. Facts found by a
referee. In the summer of 1855 Mary Snow, being then a married woman, borrowed from the plaintiff $275 for the use of her
husband in his own business. At that time she had title by
deed from her father, of his homestead in Rochester, of which her
father held a life lease from her. Her husband died in 1858, her
father in 1859, and her mother in 1860. The referee also found
facts, which, it was claimed, showed promises by Mary Snow to pay
the debt, made on several occasions between 1855 and the time of
her death in 1883: while she was sole and the owner of property in
her own right, the latest of which was within six years before her
'death.
Worcester & Crafney, for the plaintiff.
T. J. Smith and J. G. Ball, for the defendant.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
SMITH, J.-When the defendant's intestate borrowed the sum of
$275 of the plaintiff, in 1855, she was a married woman. The
money was borrowed for the use of her husband in his business, and
there is no evidence that it was otherwise used or applied. She
had, at the time of the loan, title by deed to her father's homestead
in Rochester, subject to her lease to him for the term of his life.
It does not appear that she held this property to her sole and separate use, or that the promise made by her to the plaintiff was in
respect to her separate property. Her common-law disability, therefore, rendered her contract void: Bailey v. Pearson,29 N. H. 77;
Ames v. Foster,42 Id. 381 ; Shannon v. Canney, 44 N. 592;
Hammond v. Corbett, 51 N. I. 311 ; Bachelder v. Sargent, 47
Id. 262; Muzzey v. Reardon, 57 Id. 378 ; Read v. Hall, Id. 482;
I See Bentley v. Lamb, ante, p. 632, and note.
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Mifesser v. Smyth, 58 Id. 298; PenacookSavings Bankv. Sanborn,
60 Id. 558. The question then is, whether assumpsit can be maintained upon her promise to pay the debt, made after the death of
her husband ; or, in other words, whether a moral obligation to pay
money or perform a duty is a good consideration for a promise to
pay, or to do the duty.
In a note to Wennall v. Adney, 8 Bos. & Pul. 249, is a review
of many of the English cases, the result being summed up as follows: "An express promise, therefore, as it should seem, can only
revive a precedent good consideration, which might have been enforced at law, through the medium of an implied promise, had it
not been suspended by some positive rule of law, but can give no
original right of action, if the obligation on which it is founded never
could have been enforced at law, though not barred by any legal
maxim or statute provision." The doctrine of this note is approved
in Smith v. Ware, 18 Johns. 257 ; Mills v. Wyman, 8 Pick. 207;
Goodright v. Straphan, Cowp. 201; Littlefield v. Szee, 2 B. &
Ad. 811 ; Meyer v. Haworth, 8 A. & E. 467 ; .Eastwood v. Kenyon, 11 Id. 438 ; Jennings v. Brown, 9 M. & W. 501 ; and in 1
Pars. on Cont. 432-436.
In Loyd v. Lee, 1 Str. 94 (decided in 1718), the facts were
these: A married woman gave a promissory note as a feme sole,
and after her husband's death, in consideration of forbearance, promised to pay it. In an action against her it was insisted that though
being under coverture at the time of giving the note, it was voidable for that reason: yet by her subsequent promise, when she was
of ability to make a promise, she bad made herself liable, and the
forbearance was a new consideration. "But the C. J.held the contrary, and that the note was not barely voidable, but absolutely
void; and forbearance, where originally there is no cause of action,
is no consideration to raise an assumpsit. But he said it might be
otherwise, where the contract was but voidable. And so the plaintiff was called."
Lee v. .Huggeridge, 5 Taunt. 86 (decided in 1818), a similar
case, was decided the other way. The facts were as follows: A
married woman, having an estate settled to her separate use, gave a
bond for repayment by her executors of money advanced at her
request on security of the bond to her son-in-law. After her husband's decease she wrote a letter -addressed to the plaintiff, stating
"that it was not in her power to pay the bond off, her time here
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was short, and that it would be settled by her executors." The
plaintiff brought assumpsit on this promise, against her executors,
and recovered a verdict. The defendants moved in arrest of judgment, on the ground that no sufficient consideration was shown for
the promise. The verdict was sustained upon the ground that a
moral obligation is a good cause for a promise to pay.
In Littlefield v. Shee, 2 B. & Ad. 811 (1831), the facts were
these: The plaintiff's testate in his lifetime, supplied the defendant,
a married woman, whose husband was absent, with butcher's meat.
After the death of her husband, the defendant promised to pay when
it should be in her power, and her ability to pay was proved at the
trial. The plaintiff was nonsuited, and the nonsuit was sustained,
upon the ground that it appeared the goods were supplied to the
wife whilst her husband was living, so that the price constituted a
debt due from him. Lord TENTERDEN, C. J., in alluding to Lee
v. Hlluggeridge, said, "The doctrine that a moral obligation is a
sufficient consideration for a subsequent promise is one which should
be received with some limitation."
In lfeyer v. Hfaworth, 8 A. & E. 467 (1838), the defendant
pleaded coverture to a declaration in assumpsit for goods sold and
delivered. The plaintiff replied that the defendant was at the time
of the contract separated from her husband, and living in open
adultery; that the plaintiff did not know of the marriage or adultery ; and that the defendant, after her husband's death and before
action brought, in consideration of the premises, promised to pay.
Upon demurrer, Lord DENMAN, C. J., said the subsequent promise
was " not sufficient. The debt was never owing from her. If
there was a moral obligation, that should have been shown." LiTTLEDALE, J., said,-" If there was any moral obligation, it should
have been stated. The replication does not support the declaration.
The promise in the declaration was altogether void. This is not
like the case of an infant whose promise is voidable only."
Bcastwood v. Kenyon, 11 A. & E. 438 (1840), decides that a
pecuniary benefit voluntarily conferred by the plaintiff and accepted
by the defendant is not such a consideration as will support an action of assumpsit on a subsequent express promise by the defendant
to reimburse the plaintiff. Lord DENMAN, 0. J., commenting on
Lee v. zuggeridge, said the remark of Lord TENTERDEN in Littlefield v. Shee, "that the doctrine that a moral obligation is a sufficient consideration for a subsequent promise is one which should be
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received with some limitation," amounts to a dissent from the authority of that case.
CockshoU v. Bennett, 2 T. R. 763 (1788), decides that a subsequent promise to pay a note void on the ground of fraud, is a
promise without consideration, which will not maintain an action:
and in Jennings v. Brown, 9 M. & W. 501, it was said: "A mere
moral consideration is nothing."
Attempts have been made to distinguish the case of Lee v. Muggeridge from Loyd v. Lee and subsequent cases; but the doctrine
of the note in Wennall v. Adney, that a mere moral obligation is
not sufficient to support an express promise, is generally recognised
as correct: Mills v. Wyman, 3 Pick. 207; Loomis v. Newhall, 15
Id. 159; White v. Bluett, 24 E. L. & E. 434; Cook v. Bradley, 7
Conn. 57; Hawley v. Farrar,1 Vt. 420; Ingraham v. Gilbert,
20 Barb. 152; Bates v. Watson, 1 Sneed 376; Parkerv. Carter,
4 Munf. 273; McPherson v. Bees, 2 P. & W. 521; Prear v.
Hardenbergh, 5 Johns. 272; Society v. Wheeler, 2 Gall. 143;
Broom Leg. Max. 746; 1 Pars. Oont. 432 n. (t.), 435; Langdell
Sum. Law of Cont., sects. 71-79.
"In cases of bankruptcy and the Statute of Limitations the law
only suspends the remedy. It does not extinguish the debt: Bank
v. Wood, 59 N. H. 407; Badger v. Gilmore, 33 Id. 361; Wiggin
v. Hodgdon, 63 Id. 99. The contracts of infants are voidable, and
may be ratified by an express promise after age. In this respect
they are distinguished from the contracts of married women, which,
owing to the disability of coverture, are void at common law.
Being void, no debt ever existed; and hence they furnish no consideration for a subsequent promise made during widowhood: Watkins v. Halstead, 2 Sandf. 311; Waters v. Bean, 15 Ga. 358; 1
Pars. Cont. 435. This doctrine has received assent in this state;
French v. Benton, 44 N. H. 28, 31.
It has been assumed in this discussion that the defendant's testatc
promised to pay the debt within six years of her death. Whethei
the evidence was sufficient to warrant such a finding is a questior.
we have no occasion to consider. The defendant is entitled tc
judgment on the report.
Case discharged.
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Supreme Court of Illinois.
MILLET v. THE PEOPLE.
The words "due process of law," in the constitutional provision " that noperson
shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law," are
synonymous with the words "the law of the land," which mean general public law,
binding upon all the members of the community, under all circumstances, and not
partial or priiate laws, affecting the rights of private individuals or classes of individuals.
Sect. 29, art. 4, of the constitution of Illinois, which enjoins legislation in the
interest of miners, means legislation for the personal safety of miners, and relates
only to the enactment of police regulations to promote that end.
So far as the owner or operator of .a mine shall contract for the mining of coal, or
the selling of coal by weight, there is no constitutional objection to the statutes
imposing upon him the duty of procuring scales for that purpose; but when he has
no necessity for the use of scales in these respects, he cannot he compelled to keep
and use them.
So much of the act of 1885, amendatory of the act of 1883, providing for the
weighing of coal at mines, as provides that all contracts for the mining of coal, in
which the weighing of the coal, as provided for in that act, shall be dispensed with,
shall be null and void, is in violation of the constitution.
It is not competent for the legislature, under the constitution, to single out owners
and operators of coal mines, and provide that they shall bear burdens not imposed
on other owners of property or employers of labor, and prohibit them from making
contracts which it is competent for other owners of property or employers of labor to
make. Such legislation cannot be sustained as an exercise of the police power.
The legislature has not the power to require the owners and operators of coal
mines in this state to furnish scales, and employ a person to use them and keep
books of entries of weights, for the benefit or information of the public, without
first making compensation to tne owners, that being tantamount to an appropriation
to public use of private property, which is the cost of the scales, and a clerk to keep
the books.
APPEAL

from the Circuit Court of St. Clair county.

Wilderman & Hamill, for the appellant.
George Hunt, Attorney-General, and James XM.Dill, for the

People.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
SCHOLFIELD, J.-The defendant was indicted and convicted of
ffiling, as the agent of the owner of a certain coal mine, to cause
to be furnished and placed upon the railroad track, adjacent to the
coal mine, a track scale of standard measure, upon which to weigh
the coal hoisted from the mine, as provided by section 1 of "An
VOL. XXXIV.-99
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act to provide for the weighing of coal at the mines," approved
June 14th 1883, and the several sections of the act to amend sections 2, 3 and 4 of that act, approved June 29th 1885.
We held in Jones v. The People, 110 Ill. 590, that it was competent to show, in defence of a person indicted under the same section before the approval of the amendatory act of June 29th 1885,
that at the time the act took effect, and long prior thereto, the corporation in that case owning and operating the coal mine had a
contract with all the men employed to mine coal in that mine,
during that period, to receive, as the wages for their labor, from
said company, the sum of forty cents per box for each box of coal
mined and taken from said mine; that all the persons employed in
the mine to mine coal for said company, bad always been and were
then perfectly satisfied to work under said contract, and that they
did not want the coal taken from the mine weighed, as a basis upon
which to compute their wages, &c. It was, in considering this
question, among other things then said : " Although section 2 does
provide that the weight determined by weighing on the scales furnished shall be considered the basis upon which the wages of persons mining coal shall be computed, we do not regard this as requiring that in all contracts for the mining of coal, the wages of the
miners must be computed upon the basis of the weight of the coal
mined. That would be a quite arbitrary provision-seemingly an
undue interference with men's rights of making contracts-and we
cannot ascribe to the legislature the making of such an enactment
unless it be plainly declared, which is not done in this case."
The second section of the amendatory act, approved June 29th
1885, requires that all coal produced in this state shall be weighed
on the scales, as provided in section 1 of the act approved June
14th 1883, and that a correct record of the same shall be kept, in
a well bound book furnished by the owner, agent or operator of
such mine for that purpose, by a competent person, at the expense
of such owner, agent or operator-said record to be subject to the
inspection (at all reasonable business hours) of the miner, operator,
carrier, landowner, adjacent landowner, members of the Bureau
of Labor Statistics, mine inspectors, and all others interested. Section 3 provides that it shall be lawful for the miners employed in any
coal mine or colliery in this state, to furnish a check weigher, at
their own expense, whose duty it shall be to balance said scales,
and see that the coal is properly weighed, and keep a correct
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account of the same; and for this purpose he shall have access, at
all times, to the beam box of said scales while such weighing is
being performed. The fourth section provides, that a fine, or fine
and imprisonment, as prescribed, shall be imposed on any owner or
agent operating a coal mine, failing to comply with these provisions.
And another section provides that all contracts for the mining of
coal, in which the weighing of the coal, as provided for in that act,
shall be dispensed with, shall be null and void.
The court, at the instance of the People, instructed the jury, that
since the first day of July 1885, the law prohibits the making of
any contracts between the operators of coal mines and the miners,
in which the weighing of coal as provided by law, is sought to be
avoided, and the court refused to instruct the jury "that if they
believe from the evidence, that the company for which the defendant is working does not sell or offer to sell, coal by weight at its
mine at which defendant is employed, and that it has contracts with
all the men employed in its mine to mine coal at twenty-five or
twenty cents per box, then the jury should find the defendant not
guilty."
There was evidence before the jury on which to predicate this
instruction. The question is thus presented, whether it is competent for the General Assembly to single out owners and operators
of coal mines as a distinct class, and provide that they shall bear
burdens not imposed on other owners of property or employers of
laborers, and prohibit them from making contracts which it is competent for other owners of property or employers of laborers to
make.
It is declared in section 2, article 2, of our constitution, that "no
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law." And section 13 of the same article provides that
pri'vate property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation. The words "due process of law" in this
connection, are hehl to be synonymous with the words "the law
of the land." Cooley on Const. Lim. (Ist ed.) pp. 352-3. And
this means general public law, binding upon all the members of the
community, under all circumstances, and not partial or private laws
affecting the rights of private individuals or classes of individuals:
Jones v. R 7?zolds, 2 Texas 251; see, also, IVyenheinzer v. The
People, 13 N. Y. 432 ; Vanzant v. Waddell, 2 Yerger 269.
"Every one, "says Cooley (Const. Lira., 1st ed., page 391), "has
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a right to demand that he be governed by general rules, and a
special statute that singles his case out as one to be regulated by a
different law from that which is applied in all 'similar cases, would
not be legitimate legislation, but an arbitrary mandate, unrecognised
in free government. Mr. Locke has said of those who made the
laws : ' They are to govern by promulgated, established laws, not
-to be varied in particular cases, but to have one rule for rich and
poor-for the favorite at court and the countryman at plough.' And
this may justly be said to have become a maxim in the law by which
may be tested the authority and binding force of legislative enactments."
And again, the same authority says (p. 393): "The
doubt might also arise whether a regulation made for any one class
of citizens, entirely arbitrary in its character, and restricting their
rights, privileges or legal capacities in a manner before unknown to
the law, could be sustaincd. Distinctions in these respects should
be based upon some reason which renders them important-like the
want of capacity in infants and insane persons ; but if the legislature should undertake to provide that persons following some specified lawful trade or employment should not have capacity to make
contracts, or to receive conveyances, or to build such houses as
others were allowed to erect, or in any other way to make such use
of their property as was permissible to others, it can scarcely be
doubted that the act would transcend the due bonds of legislative
power, even if it did not come in conflict with express constitutional
provisions. The man or the class forbidden the acquisition or enjoyment of property in the manner permitted to the community at large,
would be deprived of liberty in particulars of primary importance to
his or their pursuit of happiness." See, also, Budd v. The State, 3
Humph. 483, where one of the sections of the act incorporating the
Union Bank, which provided that if any of the officers, agents or
servants of that bank should embezzle the funds of the bank, or
make false entries, they should be guilty of felony, was held unconstitutional, because it did not apply generally t6 officers, agents or
servants of banks committing like offences. And Wally's Heirs v.
Kennedy, 2 Yerg. 554, where an act authorizing the court to dismiss Indian reservation cases where prosecuted for the use of another,
was held unconstitutional. In the last case the court said : "The
rights of every individual must stand or fall by the same rule or
law that governs every other membek of the body politic, or land,
under similar circumstances ; and every partial or private law which
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directly proposes to destroy or affect individual rights, or does the
same thing by affording remedies leading to similar consequences,
is unconstitutional and void. Were it otherwise, odious individuals
or corporate bodies would be governed by one law, the mass of the
community and those who made the law, by another; whereas a like
general law, affecting the whole community equally, could not have
been passed." On the like principle is, also, The Peoplev. Marx,
99 N. Y. 377.
What is there in the condition or situation of the laborer in the
mine, to disqualify him from contracting in regard to the price of
his labor, or in regard to the mode of ascertaining the price ? And
why should the owner of the mine, or the agent in control of
the mine, not be allowed to contract in respect to matters as to
which all other property owners and agents may contract ? Undoubtedly, if these sections fall within the police power, they may
be maintained'on that ground ; but it is quite obvious that they do
not. Their requirements have no tendency to insure the personal
safety of the miner, or to protect his property, or the property of
others. They do not meet Dwarris' definition of police, regulations.
They do not have reference to the comfort, the safety, or the welfare of society: Potter's Dwarris on Statutes 458. In Austin v.
Murray, 16 Pick. 221, it was said: " The law will not allow the
rights of property to be invaded under the guise of a police regulation, for the promotion of health, when it is manifest that such is
not the object and purpose of the regulation." See, also, to like
effect, the language of COLT, J., in Watertown v. Mayo, 109 Mass.
315, and the opinion of the court and cases referred to in Matter
of Application of Jacobs, 98 N. Y. 109, et seg., and The People
v. Marx, supra.
But it is suggested in argument, that one purpose of the sections is to furnish needful information to the public. If that be so,
then, under section 13, article 2, supra, there must first be made
compensation to the owner of the property thus to be devoted to
public use; for it must be too apparent to need argument in its support, that to compel the purchasing of scales, and the employing of
a person to use them, for the benefit of the public, is to appropriate the private property,-i. e., the money which this will cost,
-to public use: Morse v. Stoeker, 1 Allen 1.50; State v. Glenn,
7 Jones' L. 321.
The main reliance of the counsel representing the state, to sus-
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tain the ruling below, seems, however, to be on the ground that
mining for coal is affected with a public use, so that it may be regulated by law, like public warehouses, as held in Munn v. illinois
94 U. S. (4 Otto) 113. It cannot be claimed that mining for coal
was, by the common law, affected with a public use, and therefore
specially regulated by law, like the business of inn-keepers, common
carriers, millers, &c.; and, in our opinion, it is not like the business
of public warehousing, within the principle controlling such classes

of business. The public are not compelled to resort to mine owners any more than they are compelled to resort to the owners of
wood, or turf, or even to the owners of grain, domestic animals, or
to those owning any of the other ordinary necessaries or conveniences of life, which form a part of the commerce of the country.
The owner of a coal mine is under no obligation to obtain a license
from any public authority, and, therefore, when he chooses to mine
his coal, he exercises no franchise. We are aware of no case
wherein it has been held that the owner or operator of a coal mine
stands on a different footing, as respects the control and sale of his
property, than the owner or operator of any other kind of property
in general demand by the.public.
We are not unmindful that our constitution, in sect. 29, art. 4,
enjoins legislation in the interest of miners; but this is solely as
respects their personal safety-the enactment of police regulations
to promote thatend. It recognises that the business is dangerous
to life and health, but it nowhere intimates that there is anything
in it which disqualifies parties engaged in it from contracting as
they may in regard to other matters, or that gives the public a use
in it. There is, also, in sect. 5, art. 13, a provision requiring railroad companies to permit connections to be made with their tracks,
so that coal banks or coal yards may be reached : but the same provision also applies to consignees of grain, and it affects the duty of
the carrier alone, for no duty or obligation is enjoined on the owner
of the coal bank or coal yard in that respect. We recognise fully
the right of the General Assembly, subject to the paramount authority of Congress, to prescribe weights and measures, and to
enforce their use in proper cases ; but we do not think that the
General Assembly has power to deny to persons in one kind of
business the privilege to contract for labor and to sell their products without regard to weight, while at the same time allowing to
persons in all other kinds of business this privilege, there being

